When the system fails, the record should not disappear
Source-linked incidents, challenges, findings, remedies, and evidence gaps that connect surveillance systems to the public consequences and safeguards around them.
11published, source-linked incident records
8official findings or documented remedies/reforms
3country files where a first-release evidence gap is preserved
Use the filters to examine the state of each published record. The label describes the status of the evidence, not the severity of the issue.
RECORD STATE
INCIDENT TYPE
14 of 14 country files shown
ChinaOfficial finding
Unauthorised access or sharing
CAC administrative punishment of DiDi
DATE
21 Jul 2022
SCOPE
China · DiDi Global Inc. domestic services
SOURCE TYPE
Regulatory decision, translated with original source
The Cyberspace Administration of China found unlawful collection and handling of personal information, including passenger facial-recognition data, and imposed an administrative fine.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The CAC announced an 8.026bn RMB fine and separate fines for senior executives. The source does not establish a public-surveillance deployment finding.
This is a commercial-platform data-protection finding, not evidence about every public surveillance system in China.
Internet Freedom Foundation published its analysis of RTI material and reported use of Delhi Police facial recognition beyond the stated missing-children context, including in relation to protests and investigations.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The source frames a legal and public-accountability challenge. This pilot record does not represent a court or regulator finding on the reported deployment.
The record preserves the source’s Delhi-specific reporting and does not state a nationwide use or formal finding.
No incident record published in this pilot release
DATE
Review completed 2026-08
SCOPE
Pilot evidence review
SOURCE TYPE
Evidence-gap note
The first review did not locate a sufficiently accessible, surveillance-specific incident record that meets the Editorial & Evidence Protocol’s publication threshold.
OUTCOME / STATUS
No public incident entry is published at this time. The country file remains open to a scoped, source-backed correction or addition.
Initial candidates require a more accessible primary judicial or inquiry record and a tighter surveillance-specific scope before publication.
No incident record published in this pilot release
DATE
Review completed 2026-08
SCOPE
Pilot evidence review
SOURCE TYPE
Evidence-gap note
The first review did not locate a sufficiently accessible, surveillance-specific incident record that meets the Editorial & Evidence Protocol’s publication threshold.
OUTCOME / STATUS
No public incident entry is published at this time. The country file remains open to a scoped, source-backed correction or addition.
Initial candidates require fuller source verification before cross-agency biometric-data claims can be responsibly summarised.
Glukhin v Russia: facial recognition and a peaceful protest
DATE
04 Jul 2023
SCOPE
Moscow · live facial-recognition identification of an individual protester
SOURCE TYPE
International court judgment
The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 8 in the use of facial-recognition technology to identify and prosecute a peaceful protester in Moscow.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The Court awarded just satisfaction. This case concerns the facts and legal framework before it; it is not a nationwide measure of facial-recognition use.
The ruling addresses a specific applicant and use context; it does not settle the legality of every use of the technology.
Afghanistan · biometric and identity systems linked to the former government and foreign donors
SOURCE TYPE
Human-rights investigation
Human Rights Watch documented risks created by Taliban control over systems holding sensitive biometric and personal information, with research describing uncertainty over access to individual systems.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The report called for disclosure and protective action by responsible governments, international organisations, and companies. No general finding of access to every system is made here.
The source documents risk and reported access, not a complete technical audit of all databases or every subsequent use.
Unauthorised disclosure of CCTV footage at Marina Bay Residences
DATE
19 Mar 2020
SCOPE
Marina Bay Residences · management corporation and security contractor
SOURCE TYPE
Data-protection enforcement decision
The Personal Data Protection Commission stated that MCST 3593 and New-E Security failed to put reasonable security arrangements in place to prevent unauthorised disclosure of common-property CCTV footage.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The decision identifies breaches of protection and accountability obligations and lists financial-penalty and direction tags. It does not describe state CCTV use.
This is a local private-property CCTV case, included to document a specific governance failure rather than national practice.
The Court of Appeal considered South Wales Police’s live automated facial-recognition deployments and found aspects of the framework unlawful, including the data-protection impact assessment and public-sector equality duty.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The judgment gave binding guidance on the case and deployment context. It does not prohibit every facial-recognition deployment in the United Kingdom.
The record is limited to the court’s findings about South Wales Police’s stated system and period of use.
A settlement followed Robert Williams’s wrongful arrest after Detroit Police relied on an incorrect facial-recognition result in a 2020 investigation.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The announced settlement includes restrictions on arresting people solely on facial-recognition results, training requirements, an audit, and monetary damages. The record does not measure nationwide practice.
The ACLU statement describes a Detroit settlement; its policy characterisation should not be read as a national legal standard.
Mexico · proposed national mobile-phone user registry
SOURCE TYPE
Attributable court-reporting record
Mexico’s Supreme Court invalidated the planned PANAUT registry, which would have required biometric information including fingerprints or eye biometrics for mobile-phone users.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The court struck down the registry on constitutional grounds; the record is a remedy in relation to that proposed registry, not a finding about existing surveillance systems.
This entry concerns a proposed registry and does not describe the full range of biometric or surveillance practice in Mexico.
A judge in São Paulo ruled that the city metro must stop using facial-recognition technology on its network in the reported case brought by civil-society and public-defender organisations.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The reported judicial injunction blocked the described metro deployment. The pilot does not treat this local case as a national determination about facial recognition.
The record is limited to the described metro system and reported injunction; later procedural developments require separate review.
Citizen Lab reported forensic evidence of attempts to target former MP Ahmed Eltantawy with Cytrox’s Predator spyware after he announced a presidential bid, and stated its technical attribution to the Egyptian government with high confidence.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The report documented the technical evidence and responsible-disclosure work. This record does not present a judicial or regulatory finding on the allegation.
The entry uses Citizen Lab’s stated attribution and scope; it does not assert a court-established finding or identify every user of the technology.
Japan · Tokyo police files concerning Muslim communities
SOURCE TYPE
Attributable court-reporting record
Reporting on the Supreme Court outcome described compensation for the privacy impact of a police-files leak that exposed profiling material, while the underlying broad surveillance challenge was dismissed.
OUTCOME / STATUS
The reported outcome includes compensation for the leak; it does not establish that the courts found the wider monitoring unlawful.
The source is a 2016 report on a specific leak and litigation outcome; it does not provide a current account of police practice.
No incident record published in this pilot release
DATE
Review completed 2026-08
SCOPE
Pilot evidence review
SOURCE TYPE
Evidence-gap note
The first review did not locate a sufficiently accessible, surveillance-specific incident record that meets the Editorial & Evidence Protocol’s publication threshold.
OUTCOME / STATUS
No public incident entry is published at this time. The country file remains open to a scoped, source-backed correction or addition.
The first-pass national-ID exposure candidate needs an accessible, attributable source beyond the initial summary before an incident record can be published.
Every published entry names the place, date, evidence state, source, outcome, and scope limitation. The monitor will add a public history when an accepted submission changes the record.