COUNTRY EVIDENCE FILE
KORU / WHO IS WATCHING? · PILOT 1.9

COUNTRY PROFILE · MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

EgyptEvidence file

A readable record of documented public CCTV, AI scope, facial recognition, private-camera links, safeguards, and the jurisdictional conditions around where data may be hosted. It is not a surveillance score.

REFERENCE PLACECairo
LAST SOURCE VINTAGECCTV source updated 25 Jun 2025; WJP score 2025
PRIVACY RIGHTS9.8 / 100

THE EVIDENCE STACK

Seven records
Different claims

Every measure has its own source, date, and scope. The country profile keeps them distinct by design.

01
CCTV REFERENCE EVIDENCE

2.08 cameras / 1k

48,033 reported cameras in Cairo. Reference-city evidence only; national scope is not inferred.

Open CCTV source
FACE / BIOMETRIC

Documented active use

New Administrative Capital · 2023
Reuters reporting describes a large camera network with facial-recognition capability planned for Egypt’s New Administrative Capital. It does not demonstrate nationwide use.

Reuters · 2023
AI USE SCOPE

Crowd analytics

2023-01 · Medium confidence
Reporting on Egypt’s New Administrative Capital describes a camera network with analytical and facial-recognition capability in a specific smart-city context.

SETTING
Live public space
DECISION ROLE
Enforcement support
SCALE
Named local operation
SAFEGUARDS
No clear public detail

The record is limited to a named smart-city setting; national scale and operational decision practices are not inferred.

Context · New Administrative Capital
PRIVATE-CAMERA LINK

No comparable public evidence located

Pilot evidence review · 2026-08
The review identified camera-installation and public-network reporting, but did not validate a distinct, accessible public–private access programme for this initial layer.

No comparable public source located in this review
SAFEGUARDS CONTEXT

9.8 / 100

WJP 2025 Factor 4.6: protection from arbitrary interference with privacy in practice. The score changed -0.3 points from 2024.

Open WJP source
SUPPLIER / PROCUREMENT

Evidence gap retained

Not documented in this release
No attributed supplier, public body, and surveillance-relevant system chain was verified for this pilot record.

PUBLIC BODY
Egypt
SCOPE
Country evidence file
RECORD TYPE
No comparable record
EVIDENCE DATE
2026-08

An evidence gap is not a finding that no supplier, contract, or public procurement exists.

No comparable public source located in this review
INCIDENTS & REDRESS

Documented allegation

22 Sep 2023 · Egypt · targeted mobile-device surveillance
Predator spyware targeting of Ahmed Eltantawy

Citizen Lab reported forensic evidence of attempts to target former MP Ahmed Eltantawy with Cytrox’s Predator spyware after he announced a presidential bid, and stated its technical attribution to the Egyptian government with high confidence.

The entry uses Citizen Lab’s stated attribution and scope; it does not assert a court-established finding or identify every user of the technology.

Citizen Lab · University of Toronto Open incidents & redress

DATA INFRASTRUCTURE & JURISDICTION

Where data may sit, and what can govern it

These are separate contextual records. Data-centre capacity is not evidence of surveillance access; legal powers are not evidence of their use.

CONTEXT, NOT PROOF

Core capacity information is market reporting and localisation is sensitivity-based, so the layer should not be overread as a universal hosting regime.

Medium confidence
DATA-CENTRE CONTEXT

Reported strategy context

2025
Public market reporting describes a national cloud and data-centre strategy; the pilot does not turn this into a facility-comparison metric.

GlobeNewswire · Egypt market report
DATA RESIDENCY

Sensitivity-based localisation

2024
Cloud First policy reporting describes domestic hosting for secret and top-secret government data, rather than a universal personal-data rule.

Digital Policy Alert · Egypt Cloud First
PUBLIC-SECTOR CLOUD

Government Cloud First policy

2024
Public policy reporting describes cloud prioritisation for government entities and licensed providers; workload scope is not inferred.

DiG Watch · Egypt Cloud First
LAWFUL-ACCESS CONTEXT

Retention and disclosure powers

2018
Cybercrime-law material provides a statutory context for data retention and access. It does not identify a named surveillance system.

WIPO Lex · Law 175/2018

SOURCE HISTORY

When the record changed.

The timeline preserves source vintages and review dates so changes can be examined rather than announced without a record.

  1. 2024
    Safeguards baseline

    WJP privacy-rights score: 10.1 / 100.

    Open source
  2. 2025-06
    CCTV evidence source

    Cairo: 48,033 reported cameras; 2.08 per 1,000 people in the documented reference place.

    Open source
  3. 2025
    Safeguards update

    WJP privacy-rights score: 9.8 / 100 (-0.3 points year on year).

    Open source
  4. 2023
    Facial-recognition record

    Reuters reporting describes a large camera network with facial-recognition capability planned for Egypt’s New Administrative Capital. It does not demonstrate nationwide use.

    Open source
  5. 2026-08
    Camera-integration record

    The review identified camera-installation and public-network reporting, but did not validate a distinct, accessible public–private access programme for this initial layer.

    No comparable public source located in this review
  6. 2023-01
    AI use-scope record

    Crowd analytics · Live public space · Enforcement support. Reporting on Egypt’s New Administrative Capital describes a camera network with analytical and facial-recognition capability in a specific smart-city context.

    Open source
  7. 2026-08
    Supplier / procurement record

    No attributed supplier, public body, and surveillance-relevant system chain was verified for this pilot record.

    No comparable public source located in this review
  8. 2025
    Data-infrastructure context

    Public market reporting describes a national cloud and data-centre strategy; the pilot does not turn this into a facility-comparison metric.

    Open source
  9. 2018
    Lawful-access context

    Cybercrime-law material provides a statutory context for data retention and access. It does not identify a named surveillance system.

    Open source
  10. 22 Sep 2023
    Incident / redress record

    Documented allegation: Citizen Lab reported forensic evidence of attempts to target former MP Ahmed Eltantawy with Cytrox’s Predator spyware after he announced a presidential bid, and stated its technical attribution to the Egyptian government with high confidence.

    Open source
  11. 2026-08
    Layer evidence review

    Record category: Partial layer record. This version preserves gaps rather than treating them as evidence of absence.

    No comparable public source located in this review

REVIEWED PUBLIC UPDATES

Accepted additions and corrections.

Community submissions remain private until an editor checks the source, scope, and status. Only accepted changes appear here.

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