COUNTRY EVIDENCE FILE

KORU / WHO IS WATCHING? · PILOT 1.9

COUNTRY PROFILE · EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA

RussiaEvidence file

A readable record of documented public CCTV, AI scope, facial recognition, private-camera links, safeguards, and the jurisdictional conditions around where data may be hosted. It is not a surveillance score.

REFERENCE PLACEMoscow

LAST SOURCE VINTAGECCTV source updated 25 Jun 2025; WJP score 2025

PRIVACY RIGHTS8.9 / 100

THE EVIDENCE STACK

Seven records
Different claims

Every measure has its own source, date, and scope. The country profile keeps them distinct by design.

CCTV REFERENCE EVIDENCE

19.63 cameras / 1k

250,000 reported cameras in Moscow. Reference-city evidence only; national scope is not inferred.

Open CCTV source

FACE / BIOMETRIC

Documented active use

Moscow · 2021–2023
Human Rights Watch and other documented reporting describe public facial-recognition deployment in Moscow; the record does not imply identical use nationwide.

Human Rights Watch · 2021

AI USE SCOPE

Facial identification

2021 · Medium confidence
Human Rights Watch documented the use of facial recognition in Moscow’s public camera network, including in policing and protest contexts.

SETTING: Live public space
DECISION ROLE: Enforcement support
SCALE: Named local operation
SAFEGUARDS: No clear public detail

Documented use is concentrated in Moscow reporting; equivalent nationwide use and oversight conditions are not inferred.

Human Rights Watch · Moscow

PRIVATE-CAMERA LINK

Documented networked camera ecosystem

Moscow and regional Safe City programmes · 2023
Reporting describes Safe City systems drawing on public and privately situated cameras. Technical rules and the extent of routine police access vary and remain opaque.

OVD-Info · 2023

SAFEGUARDS CONTEXT

8.9 / 100

WJP 2025 Factor 4.6: protection from arbitrary interference with privacy in practice. The score changed -3.3 points from 2024.

Open WJP source

SUPPLIER / PROCUREMENT

Evidence gap retained

Not documented in this release
No attributed supplier, public body, and surveillance-relevant system chain was verified for this pilot record.

PUBLIC BODY: Russia
SCOPE: Country evidence file
RECORD TYPE: No comparable record
EVIDENCE DATE: 2026-08

An evidence gap is not a finding that no supplier, contract, or public procurement exists.

No comparable public source located in this review

DATA INFRASTRUCTURE & JURISDICTION

Where data may sit, and what can govern it

These are separate contextual records. Data-centre capacity is not evidence of surveillance access; legal powers are not evidence of their use.

CONTEXT, NOT PROOF

Capacity reporting is market-based and may exclude private or classified infrastructure; legal provisions do not establish operational access patterns.

Medium confidence

DATA-CENTRE CONTEXT

Reported market context

2026
Public market tracking reports data-centre growth, but the pilot does not use a third-party facility count as a surveillance measure.

Statista · data-centre count snapshot

DATA RESIDENCY

Domestic storage requirement

2015
Federal Law No. 242-FZ is commonly cited for domestic storage and processing requirements for Russian citizens’ personal data.

Stanford WILMap · Federal Law 242-FZ

PUBLIC-SECTOR CLOUD

State cloud platform

2019
Public descriptions document the State Unified Cloud Platform; scope and operational use vary by government function.

TAdviser · Gosoblako

LAWFUL-ACCESS CONTEXT

Retention and key-disclosure duties

2016
Yarovaya-law analysis describes metadata/content retention and decryption-key provisions. It does not identify particular surveillance datasets.

Stanford WILMap · Federal Law 374-FZ

SOURCE HISTORY

When the record changed.

The timeline preserves source vintages and review dates so changes can be examined rather than announced without a record.

2024
Safeguards baseline
WJP privacy-rights score: 12.2 / 100.
Open source
2025-06
CCTV evidence source
Moscow: 250,000 reported cameras; 19.63 per 1,000 people in the documented reference place.
Open source
2025
Safeguards update
WJP privacy-rights score: 8.9 / 100 (-3.3 points year on year).
Open source
2021–2023
Facial-recognition record
Human Rights Watch and other documented reporting describe public facial-recognition deployment in Moscow; the record does not imply identical use nationwide.
Open source
2023
Camera-integration record
Reporting describes Safe City systems drawing on public and privately situated cameras. Technical rules and the extent of routine police access vary and remain opaque.
Open source
2021
AI use-scope record
Facial identification · Live public space · Enforcement support. Human Rights Watch documented the use of facial recognition in Moscow’s public camera network, including in policing and protest contexts.
Open source
2026-08
Supplier / procurement record
No attributed supplier, public body, and surveillance-relevant system chain was verified for this pilot record.
No comparable public source located in this review
2026
Data-infrastructure context
Public market tracking reports data-centre growth, but the pilot does not use a third-party facility count as a surveillance measure.
Open source
2016
Lawful-access context
Yarovaya-law analysis describes metadata/content retention and decryption-key provisions. It does not identify particular surveillance datasets.
Open source
04 Jul 2023
Incident / redress record
Official finding: The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 8 in the use of facial-recognition technology to identify and prosecute a peaceful protester in Moscow.
Open source
2026-08
Layer evidence review
Record category: Paired layer record. This version preserves gaps rather than treating them as evidence of absence.
No comparable public source located in this review

REVIEWED PUBLIC UPDATES

Accepted additions and corrections.

Community submissions remain private until an editor checks the source, scope, and status. Only accepted changes appear here.

Loading reviewed updates…

WHAT WE KNOW

01The pilot’s CCTV source reports 250,000 cameras for Moscow, equivalent to 19.63 per 1,000 people in that documented geography.

02Human Rights Watch and other documented reporting describe public facial-recognition deployment in Moscow; the record does not imply identical use nationwide.

03Reporting describes Safe City systems drawing on public and privately situated cameras. Technical rules and the extent of routine police access vary and remain opaque.

04Human Rights Watch documented the use of facial recognition in Moscow’s public camera network, including in policing and protest contexts.

05No comparable named supplier/procurement record was verified for this release.

06Official finding: Glukhin v Russia: facial recognition and a peaceful protest

07Public market tracking reports data-centre growth, but the pilot does not use a third-party facility count as a surveillance measure.

WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW

01Reference-city evidence only; national scope is not inferred.

020 supplemental layers have an explicit evidence gap. A gap means the review did not locate comparable public evidence; it does not mean the practice is absent.

03The pilot does not make a national camera-total claim unless the underlying source itself reports a national estimate.

QUESTIONS THIS RECORD RAISES

Prompts for public scrutiny, not legal advice or a conclusion about any system’s lawfulness.

01Which public body owns, operates, or oversees the documented system in Moscow, and where is that responsibility published?

02What retention period, access rule, independent oversight, and public complaint route apply to the documented record?

03When the documented system creates a biometric alert, what human review occurs before a person is stopped, investigated, or otherwise affected?

READ THE METHOD

This file is one part of KORU’s public-space chapter. It does not compare hidden surveillance capacity or decide whether a practice is lawful.

Open methodology