1.35 cameras / 1k
49,841 reported cameras in Tokyo. Metropolitan population and local camera coverage need cautious interpretation.
Open CCTV sourceCOUNTRY PROFILE · EAST ASIA & PACIFIC
A readable record of documented public CCTV, AI scope, facial recognition, private-camera links, safeguards, and the jurisdictional conditions around where data may be hosted. It is not a surveillance score.
THE EVIDENCE STACK
Every measure has its own source, date, and scope. The country profile keeps them distinct by design.
49,841 reported cameras in Tokyo. Metropolitan population and local camera coverage need cautious interpretation.
Open CCTV sourcePolice / event-security pilots · 2024
Public reporting and policy materials point to limited police and event-security facial-recognition pilots. The public evidence reviewed did not justify a broader operational label.
2026-04 · Low confidence
Public reporting describes a Tokyo ward facial-recognition camera trial; the pilot retains this as limited-use evidence.
The source documents a local trial and does not establish ongoing deployment or detailed control arrangements.
Mainichi · Tokyo ward trialMetropolitan camera registration examples · 2024
Tokyo police information describes security-camera cooperation and registration; the pilot treats this as a narrower request/registry model rather than continuous access.
WJP 2025 Factor 4.6: protection from arbitrary interference with privacy in practice. The score changed -3.2 points from 2024.
Open WJP sourcePanasonic Connect Co., Ltd.
One set of AI camera-system equipment.
The award notice identifies equipment and supplier but does not describe the system’s analytical functionality or operating policy.
JETRO — Osaka police AI camera award notice29 Jun 2016 · Japan · Tokyo police files concerning Muslim communities
Police surveillance files leak and compensation
Reporting on the Supreme Court outcome described compensation for the privacy impact of a police-files leak that exposed profiling material, while the underlying broad surveillance challenge was dismissed.
The source is a 2016 report on a specific leak and litigation outcome; it does not provide a current account of police practice.
Al Jazeera · court-outcome reporting Open incidents & redressDATA INFRASTRUCTURE & JURISDICTION
These are separate contextual records. Data-centre capacity is not evidence of surveillance access; legal powers are not evidence of their use.
Government cloud governance and legal process do not show the host location or access path for a named surveillance system.
High confidence2024
Public market sources report capacity growth, but the pilot avoids using third-party counts as a comparative surveillance measure.
2026
APPI permits international transfers subject to consent or equivalent-protection conditions; no blanket localisation requirement is coded.
2026
Digital Agency material describes a common government cloud environment, technical requirements, and service-selection process.
2026
Communications-interception legislation sets out criminal-investigation procedures; it is not evidence of administrative or camera-data access.
SOURCE HISTORY
The timeline preserves source vintages and review dates so changes can be examined rather than announced without a record.
Tokyo: 49,841 reported cameras; 1.35 per 1,000 people in the documented reference place.
Open sourcePublic reporting and policy materials point to limited police and event-security facial-recognition pilots. The public evidence reviewed did not justify a broader operational label.
Open sourceTokyo police information describes security-camera cooperation and registration; the pilot treats this as a narrower request/registry model rather than continuous access.
Open sourceFacial identification · Live public space · Assistive search. Public reporting describes a Tokyo ward facial-recognition camera trial; the pilot retains this as limited-use evidence.
Open sourcePublic market sources report capacity growth, but the pilot avoids using third-party counts as a comparative surveillance measure.
Open sourceCommunications-interception legislation sets out criminal-investigation procedures; it is not evidence of administrative or camera-data access.
Open sourceRemedy or reform: Reporting on the Supreme Court outcome described compensation for the privacy impact of a police-files leak that exposed profiling material, while the underlying broad surveillance challenge was dismissed.
Open sourceRecord category: Partial layer record. This version preserves gaps rather than treating them as evidence of absence.
No comparable public source located in this reviewREVIEWED PUBLIC UPDATES
Community submissions remain private until an editor checks the source, scope, and status. Only accepted changes appear here.
Loading reviewed updates…