COUNTRY EVIDENCE FILE
KORU / WHO IS WATCHING? · PILOT 1.9

COUNTRY PROFILE · SOUTH ASIA

AfghanistanEvidence file

A readable record of documented public CCTV, AI scope, facial recognition, private-camera links, safeguards, and the jurisdictional conditions around where data may be hosted. It is not a surveillance score.

REFERENCE PLACEKabul
LAST SOURCE VINTAGECCTV source updated 25 Jun 2025; WJP score 2025
PRIVACY RIGHTS11.9 / 100

THE EVIDENCE STACK

Seven records
Different claims

Every measure has its own source, date, and scope. The country profile keeps them distinct by design.

01
CCTV REFERENCE EVIDENCE

18.45 cameras / 1k

90,000 reported cameras in Kabul. Reference-city evidence only; national scope is not inferred.

Open CCTV source
FACE / BIOMETRIC

Documented active use

Kabul · 2025-02
BBC reporting from Kabul describes an operational CCTV system with an option to track people by facial recognition and display face categories including age and gender.

BBC · 2025
AI USE SCOPE

Facial identification

2025-02 · High confidence
BBC reporting from Kabul describes a public CCTV system that offers facial-recognition tracking and face-category displays.

SETTING
Live public space
DECISION ROLE
Assistive search
SCALE
Multi-city or agency programme
SAFEGUARDS
No clear public detail

Investigative reporting describes an operational public system, but does not fully verify its technical backend or coverage beyond reported sites.

BBC News · Kabul network
PRIVATE-CAMERA LINK

No comparable public evidence located

Pilot evidence review · 2026-08
The reviewed reporting documents central police access to the Kabul CCTV system but does not establish a comparable public–private camera-integration mechanism. This status preserves that distinction.

No comparable public source located in this review
SAFEGUARDS CONTEXT

11.9 / 100

WJP 2025 Factor 4.6: protection from arbitrary interference with privacy in practice. The score changed -2.5 points from 2024.

Open WJP source
SUPPLIER / PROCUREMENT

Documented record

Dahua branding observed in the Kabul police control room
CCTV network described as offering facial-recognition and licence-plate tracking options.

PUBLIC BODY
Taliban police force / Ministry of Interior
SCOPE
Kabul system viewed by BBC journalists.
RECORD TYPE
Journalistic supplier indication
EVIDENCE DATE
2025-02

Officials did not publish procurement documents; visible branding is a supplier indication, not a verified contract.

BBC — Inside the Taliban's surveillance network
INCIDENTS & REDRESS

Documented allegation

30 Mar 2022 · Afghanistan · biometric and identity systems linked to the former government and foreign donors
Biometric systems after the Taliban takeover

Human Rights Watch documented risks created by Taliban control over systems holding sensitive biometric and personal information, with research describing uncertainty over access to individual systems.

The source documents risk and reported access, not a complete technical audit of all databases or every subsequent use.

Human Rights Watch · research report Open incidents & redress

DATA INFRASTRUCTURE & JURISDICTION

Where data may sit, and what can govern it

These are separate contextual records. Data-centre capacity is not evidence of surveillance access; legal powers are not evidence of their use.

CONTEXT, NOT PROOF

Several sources predate the current de facto authorities, so legal and operational status needs further review.

Low confidence
DATA-CENTRE CONTEXT

Reported national data-centre context

2024
A public directory identifies the Afghanistan National Data Center in Kabul; no national facility count is used.

Data Center Map · ANDC
DATA RESIDENCY

No comparable general rule located

2026-08
The reviewed jurisdiction guide did not identify a general personal-data localisation rule suitable for a comparable pilot status.

OneTrust DataGuidance · Afghanistan
PUBLIC-SECTOR CLOUD

Government cloud policy reported

2017
An ITU presentation describes a G-Cloud direction and national data-centre host; it does not verify current operational scope.

ITU · MCIT presentation
LAWFUL-ACCESS CONTEXT

Provider-disclosure powers in statute

2005
The Telecommunications Services Regulation Law contains provider-access provisions; current enforcement may diverge from pre-2021 legal material.

Telecom law text

SOURCE HISTORY

When the record changed.

The timeline preserves source vintages and review dates so changes can be examined rather than announced without a record.

  1. 2024
    Safeguards baseline

    WJP privacy-rights score: 14.4 / 100.

    Open source
  2. 2025-06
    CCTV evidence source

    Kabul: 90,000 reported cameras; 18.45 per 1,000 people in the documented reference place.

    Open source
  3. 2025
    Safeguards update

    WJP privacy-rights score: 11.9 / 100 (-2.5 points year on year).

    Open source
  4. 2025-02
    Facial-recognition record

    BBC reporting from Kabul describes an operational CCTV system with an option to track people by facial recognition and display face categories including age and gender.

    Open source
  5. 2026-08
    Camera-integration record

    The reviewed reporting documents central police access to the Kabul CCTV system but does not establish a comparable public–private camera-integration mechanism. This status preserves that distinction.

    No comparable public source located in this review
  6. 2025-02
    AI use-scope record

    Facial identification · Live public space · Assistive search. BBC reporting from Kabul describes a public CCTV system that offers facial-recognition tracking and face-category displays.

    Open source
  7. 2025-02
    Supplier / procurement record

    CCTV network described as offering facial-recognition and licence-plate tracking options.

    Open source
  8. 2024
    Data-infrastructure context

    A public directory identifies the Afghanistan National Data Center in Kabul; no national facility count is used.

    Open source
  9. 2005
    Lawful-access context

    The Telecommunications Services Regulation Law contains provider-access provisions; current enforcement may diverge from pre-2021 legal material.

    Open source
  10. 30 Mar 2022
    Incident / redress record

    Documented allegation: Human Rights Watch documented risks created by Taliban control over systems holding sensitive biometric and personal information, with research describing uncertainty over access to individual systems.

    Open source
  11. 2026-08
    Layer evidence review

    Record category: Partial layer record. This version preserves gaps rather than treating them as evidence of absence.

    No comparable public source located in this review

REVIEWED PUBLIC UPDATES

Accepted additions and corrections.

Community submissions remain private until an editor checks the source, scope, and status. Only accepted changes appear here.

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