01
CCTV REFERENCE EVIDENCE
79.38 cameras / 1k
900,000 reported cameras in Hyderabad. Highest reference-city density cited in the 2025 study; does not represent India as a whole.
Open CCTV sourceTHE EVIDENCE STACK
Seven records
Different claims
Every measure has its own source, date, and scope. The country profile keeps them distinct by design.
FACE / BIOMETRIC
Documented active use
Hyderabad, Telangana · 2021
Amnesty reports a Command and Control Centre intended to connect facial-recognition-capable CCTV in real time, with capacity to process up to 600,000 cameras.
AI USE SCOPE
Facial identification
2019-12 · Medium confidence
Reporting documented police use of facial recognition at a New Delhi public rally; the source does not justify a national deployment claim.
City-level operational reporting; decision workflow, oversight, and broader geographic use are not established here.
Al Jazeera · Delhi public-rally reportPRIVATE-CAMERA LINK
No comparable public evidence located
Pilot evidence review · 2026-08
Sources reviewed did not provide a sufficiently clear, accessible account of a public–private camera-access mechanism comparable across India. This is a data gap, not a claim of no integration.
SAFEGUARDS CONTEXT
38.7 / 100
WJP 2025 Factor 4.6: protection from arbitrary interference with privacy in practice. The score changed -0.5 points from 2024.
Open WJP sourceSUPPLIER / PROCUREMENT
Evidence gap retained
Not documented in this release
No attributed supplier, public body, and surveillance-relevant system chain was verified for this pilot record.
An evidence gap is not a finding that no supplier, contract, or public procurement exists.
No comparable public source located in this reviewINCIDENTS & REDRESS
Documented allegation
03 Jul 2020 · Delhi · police facial-recognition use
Delhi Police facial-recognition purpose expansion
Internet Freedom Foundation published its analysis of RTI material and reported use of Delhi Police facial recognition beyond the stated missing-children context, including in relation to protests and investigations.
The record preserves the source’s Delhi-specific reporting and does not state a nationwide use or formal finding.
Internet Freedom Foundation · Project Panoptic Open incidents & redressDATA INFRASTRUCTURE & JURISDICTION
Where data may sit, and what can govern it
These are separate contextual records. Data-centre capacity is not evidence of surveillance access; legal powers are not evidence of their use.
CONTEXT, NOT PROOF
Residency obligations are mainly sector-specific; infrastructure capacity does not establish state ownership or access to camera feeds.
High confidenceNational capacity context
2025
The Ministry of Electronics & IT reports about 1,500 MW of national data-centre capacity in 2025, up from about 375 MW in 2020. This is capacity context only.
Sector-specific localisation
2023
Payment-system data has a domestic-storage requirement; the DPDP Act provides a wider transfer framework subject to notified restrictions.
Government cloud framework
2026
MeghRaj / GI Cloud publishes a government-cloud framework and an empanelled-provider approach. It does not identify individual surveillance workloads.
Disclosure and retention powers
2022
IT Act and CERT-In directions are cited for disclosure and log-retention powers. This record does not infer individual access activity.
SOURCE HISTORY
When the record changed.
The timeline preserves source vintages and review dates so changes can be examined rather than announced without a record.
- 2024
- 2025-06CCTV evidence source
Hyderabad: 900,000 reported cameras; 79.38 per 1,000 people in the documented reference place.
Open source - 2025
- 2021Facial-recognition record
Amnesty reports a Command and Control Centre intended to connect facial-recognition-capable CCTV in real time, with capacity to process up to 600,000 cameras.
Open source - 2026-08Camera-integration record
Sources reviewed did not provide a sufficiently clear, accessible account of a public–private camera-access mechanism comparable across India. This is a data gap, not a claim of no integration.
No comparable public source located in this review - 2019-12AI use-scope record
Facial identification · Live public space · Unknown. Reporting documented police use of facial recognition at a New Delhi public rally; the source does not justify a national deployment claim.
Open source - 2026-08Supplier / procurement record
No attributed supplier, public body, and surveillance-relevant system chain was verified for this pilot record.
No comparable public source located in this review - 2025Data-infrastructure context
The Ministry of Electronics & IT reports about 1,500 MW of national data-centre capacity in 2025, up from about 375 MW in 2020. This is capacity context only.
Open source - 2022Lawful-access context
IT Act and CERT-In directions are cited for disclosure and log-retention powers. This record does not infer individual access activity.
Open source - 03 Jul 2020Incident / redress record
Documented allegation: Internet Freedom Foundation published its analysis of RTI material and reported use of Delhi Police facial recognition beyond the stated missing-children context, including in relation to protests and investigations.
Open source - 2026-08Layer evidence review
Record category: Partial layer record. This version preserves gaps rather than treating them as evidence of absence.
No comparable public source located in this review
REVIEWED PUBLIC UPDATES
Accepted additions and corrections.
Community submissions remain private until an editor checks the source, scope, and status. Only accepted changes appear here.
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